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Abstract: This Trends article discusses North Korean use of blackmail and brinkmanship in its
relationship with other countries, comparing that to the United States’ use of “carrots and sticks” in its
dealings with Iraq.
Although there is significant regional support--e.g., among Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia--for
bilateral talks between North Korea and the United States Government (USG) concerning the North
Korea’s nuclear weapons-related activities, the USG position supports multilateral talks. To the USG, the
very implementation of bilateral talks would reward North Korea for engaging in activities that might
lead to an increase in nuclear weapons capability. In essence, the USG would construe itself and could
be construed by others to be rewarding black mail and brinkmanship.
However, if bilateral talks would, indeed, lead to the prevention or slowing down of further nuclear
weapons development, then USG insisting on multilateral talks would be detrimental to USG interests. If
insisting on multilateral talks is detrimental to USG interests, North Korea would be rewarded for its
recent nuclear weapons-related activities. In this latter case, North Korea would be rewarded by
engaging in activities leading to an adversary taking action not in that adversary’s best interests.
Moreover, since the notion of bilateral talks within a multilateral infrastructure has already been
broached by the USG, the validity of the reward distinction stemming from bilateral versus multilateral
talks seems tenuous at best.
Also, if North Korea’s threatening to ramp up nuclear weapons development--unless there would be
suitable USG recognition of North Korean sovereignty, a formal promise not to attack North Korea, and
provision of significant economic aid--is blackmail and brinkmanship, what would one call the USG
threat of war against Iraq unless the latter gives up its weapons of mass destruction, documentation
about relevant weapons and precursors destroyed, and changes its regime? In this case, of course,
neither bilateral nor multilateral talks seem to be on the table. The bottom line is that seeking to employ
carrots and sticks among political actors--contingently and non-contingently, cooperatively and
competitively--is the very essence of politics. (See Dao, J. (March 6, 2003). Criticism of Bush’s policy on
Korea sharpens. The New York Times, p. A16; Moessinger, P. (1977). Developmental study of exchange
and blackmailing. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 131, 255-259; Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A.M. (1966).
The game of chicken. American Behavioral Scientist, 10, 10-14; 23-28; Vatz, R. E., & Weinberg, L. S.
(1977). A Szaszian view of death, or the myth of death. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 17, 71-73.)
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